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Abstract
Differentially private (DP) learning, which aims to accurately extract patterns from the given
dataset without exposing individual information, is an important subfield in machine learning
and has been extensively explored. However, quantum algorithms that could preserve privacy,
while outperform their classical counterparts, are still lacking. The difficulty arises from the
distinct priorities in DP and quantum machine learning, i.e., the former concerns a low utility
bound while the latter pursues a low runtime cost. These varied goals request that the proposed
quantum DP algorithm should achieve the runtime speedup over the best known classical results
while preserving the optimal utility bound.
The Lasso estimator is broadly employed to tackle the high dimensional sparse linear regres-
sion tasks, i.e., finding θ ∈ Rd with ‖θ‖1 ≤ l1 such that ‖Xθ − y‖22 is minimum for the given
inputs X ∈ RN×d and y ∈ RN , where N is the sample size and d is the data dimension with
N  d. The main contribution of this paper is devising a quantum DP Lasso estimator to earn
the runtime speedup with the privacy preservation, i.e., the runtime complexity is O˜(N3/2
√
d)
with a nearly optimal utility bound O˜(1/N2/3). Since the optimal classical (private) Lasso takes
Ω(N + d) runtime, our proposal achieves quantum speedups when N < O(d1/3). There are two
key components in our algorithm. First, we extend the Frank-Wolfe algorithm from the clas-
sical Lasso to the quantum scenario, where the proposed quantum non-private Lasso achieves
a quadratic runtime speedup over the optimal classical Lasso. Second, we develop an adaptive
privacy mechanism to ensure the privacy guarantee of the non-private Lasso. Our proposal
opens an avenue to design various learning tasks with both the proven runtime speedups and
the privacy preservation.
1 Introduction
Quantum machine learning, as a burgeoning field in quantum computation, aims to facilitate ma-
chine learning tasks with quantum advantages [1]. Numerous theoretical studies have shown that
quantum machine learning algorithms can dramatically reduce the runtime complexity over their
classical counterparts, e.g., quantum perceptron [2] and quantum kernel classifier [3]. Meanwhile,
experimental studies have been conducted that employ near-term quantum devices to accomplish
toy-model learning tasks with promising performances [4–9]. Both theoretical and experimental
results suggest that we are stepping into a new era, in which the near-term quantum processor [10]
can be applied to benefit real-world machine learning tasks.
Quantum private learning, in contrast to the auspicious achievements of public data learning,
has not been well explored yet. Very few studies investigated the connection between classical
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and quantum data privacy [11–13]. However, as a central topic in machine learning [14, 15], the
significance to devise quantum private learning algorithms is continuously increasing. Due to legal,
financial, or moral reasons, private learning targets to train an accurate learning model without
exposing the precise information in individual training example, e.g., genomic data and medical
records for patients. Thus, in many applications, the legibility of the proposed quantum learning
algorithms will be questioned if they cannot promise the privacy guarantee. Differential privacy
(DP), which quantitively formalizes a rigorous and standard notion of ‘privacy’, provides one of
the most prominent solutions towards private learning [16]. During the past decade, extensive DP
learning algorithms have been proposed under varied practical settings [17–21].
A fundamental topic in privacy learning is devising privately sparse regression learning models
[20, 22]. Let D = {Xi,yi}Ni=1 be the given dataset, where Xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ R are the i-th feature
vector and the corresponding target, respectively. Equivalently, we write D = {X ∈ RN×d,y ∈
RN}. In all practical scenarios, N  d. Suppose that the dataset D satisfies y = Xθ∗ + ω,
where θ∗ ∈ Rd with ‖θ∗‖0 = s (i.e., s  N) is the underlying sparse parameter to be estimated,
and ω ∈ Rd is the noise vector. The goal of the privately sparse regression learning is to recover
θ∗ while satisfying differential privacy. The mainstream learning model to tackle this task is the
private Lasso estimator [23], which estimates θ∗ by minimizing the loss function L(θ)
arg min
θ∈C
L(θ) := 1
2N
‖Xθ − y‖22 , (1)
where the constraint set C = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖1 ≤ l1} is an `1 norm ball that guarantees the sparsity
of the estimated result and the differential privacy should be preserved with respect to any change
of the individual pair (Xi,yi). Following the conventions [20, 22–24], we set l1 = 1, and suppose
that ‖X‖F ≤ 1 and ‖y‖1 ≤ 1 throughout the paper. Note that our results can be easily generalized
to l1 ∈ R+, ‖X‖F ≤ R+, and ‖y‖1 ≤ R+.
An important utility measure of the private Lasso is the expected excess empirical risk RL, i.e.,
RL := E(L(θ))−min
θ∈C
L(θ) , (2)
where the expectation is taken over the internal randomness of the algorithm for generating θ.
The studies [22, 23] proposed private Lasso algorithms with the utility bound O˜(1/N2/3). Ref. [25]
presented a private algorithm with O˜(1/N) utility bound, under the strong convexity and mutual
incoherence assumptions. All of these algorithms run in time that is polynomial in N and d.
Despite the achievements in the classical scenario, how to design quantum private Lasso remains
unknown and is very challenging because of the disparate priorities of quantum machine learning
and DP learning. Specifically, quantum machine learning algorithms aim to achieve a low runtime
cost, while DP learning algorithms concern a low utility bound. Therefore, the proposed quantum
private learning algorithm should accommodate the following requirements from each side:
• the runtime cost should outperform its classical counterparts;
• the utility bound is expected to be nearly optimal.
Contributions. The main contribution in this study is devising a quantum differentially
private Lasso estimator to tackle the private sparse regression learning tasks that yields a better
runtime complexity than the best known classical Lasso and a nearly optimal utility guarantee. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first quantum private learning algorithm that can accomplish
practical learning problems with the provable advantages.
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To make a fair comparison, the quantum input/output models used in our study are restricted
to have an almost identical setting to the classical case [26], except that we allow coherent queries
to the entries of given inputs. Such quantum input/output models were employed in [3] to design
a sublinear runtime quantum kernel classifier. Let us further emphasize the importance of the
employed quantum input model. As questioned by [3], using quantum input models that are too
powerful may cause the achieved quantum speedup inconclusive. Alternatively, given a strong
classical input model, quantum-inspired machine learning algorithms can collapse various quantum
algorithms that claimed exponential speedups [27].
The formal definition of classical and quantum input models used in this study is as follows.
Definition 1 (Classical and quantum input models). For a given dataset D = {X ∈ RN×d,y ∈
RN}, the classical (quantum) input oracles OX and Oy can recover the entry Xij and the entry yi
with i ∈ [N ] and j ∈ [d] in O(1) time (in superposition).
Note that ‘in superposition’ means that the coherent queries are permitted in quantum input
model, i.e., it is allowed to query many locations at the same time [28]. Numerous quantum
algorithms have exploited this condition to gain quantum advantages [1, 29].
Our main result is the following theorem on the runtime complexity and the utility bound of
the proposed quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism.
Theorem 1 (Informal, see Theorems 7 and 8 for the formal description). Given the quantum
input model OX and Oy in Definition 1, the proposed quantum private Lasso estimator after T ∼
O((N)2/3) iterations is (, δ)-differentially private, and outputs θ(T ) with overall O˜
(
N3/2d1/2
)
runtime and the utility bound
RL = O˜
(
1
(N)2/3
)
.
Given the classical input model formulated in Definition 1, the optimal (lower bound) runtime
of the classical Lasso is Ω(N+d) (see Lemma 2). Compared with the classical results, our quantum
private Lasso yields the runtime speedup when N ≤ O(d1/3). Moreover, the optimal utility bound
has proven to be Ω(1/(N logN)2/3) [23], which indicates that our result is nearly optimal. Con-
sequently, the proposed quantum private Lasso estimator meets the two requirements of quantum
private learning algorithm design.
We emphasize two main ingredients that differ the quantum private Lasso with the classical
private Lasso [23]. The first one is the proposed quantum Frank-Wolfe algorithm, which is employed
as the backbone of our quantum private Lasso estimator. We prove that the runtime cost of the
proposed algorithm is O˜(
√
Nd), which achieves a quadratic runtime speedup over the optimal
classical Lasso in terms of the feature dimension d. We also demonstrate that the runtime lower
bound of a quantum Lasso estimator is Ω(
√
N+
√
d). This implies that our result is nearly optimal
in terms of d. Another key component is the proposal of the adaptive privacy mechanism, which
ensures the quantum private Lasso estimator to achieve the near optimal utility guarantee and the
runtime speedup, because naive applications of existing differential privacy mechanisms will result
in runtime or the utility bound worse than its classical counterparts (See Section 4 for details).
1.1 Related work
The main focus of this study is quantum machine learning. Previous quantum machine learning
literature that is related to our work can be divided into two groups. The first group is quantum
regression algorithms and the second group is quantum differential privacy mechanisms. Here we
compare these two groups with our proposal separately.
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1.1.1 Quantum regression algorithms
There are a few proposals aiming to solve quantum regressions tasks without the privacy require-
ment. A representative quantum linear regression algorithm is proposed by [30], which showed
that the ordinary least squares fitting problem can be solved with an exponential speedup given
the assumption that there exists a quantum random access memory (QRAM) to encode classical
input into quantum states in logarithmic runtime [31, 32]. Under such an assumption, the quan-
tum linear systems algorithm [33] can be employed to obtain the closed-form expression for the
estimated solution, i.e., θ = (X>X)−1X>y, with the exponential speedup. Following this pipeline,
the subsequent quantum regression algorithms further improve the runtime complexity bound with
respect to the polynomial terms [34–36], e.g., rank and condition number, and tackle the variant
regression tasks, e.g., nonlinear regression and ridge regression [37]. In contrast to solving the
closed-form expression, the study [38] tackles the ridge regression tasks by using the gradient de-
scent method, where the runtime complexity achieves the exponential speedup at each iteration
under the QRAM assumption. We remark that such an assumption is very strong, and it is still an
open question about how to efficiently implement QRAM. Moreover, the recent quantum-inspired
algorithms adopt the similar assumption of QRAM and dequantize numerous quantum machine
learning algorithms with exponential speedups [27, 39–41].
Unlike the aforementioned results, the input model used in our proposal requires only a very
mild assumption as explained in Definition 1, and our result does not assume input data to be
low rank. Moreover, the quantum-inspired classical methods cannot collapse the runtime speedup
achieved by our quantum Lasso because we employ the quantum minimum finding algorithm as a
subroutine.
Recently, several studies developed the hybrid quantum classical methods to solve regression
tasks on near-term quantum devices [42, 43]. Since there is no theoretical convergence guarantee
for these hybrid methods, they are incomparable with our result.
1.1.2 Quantum private learning
Few studies have investigated the topic of quantum private learning [11, 13, 44, 45]. The study
[13] developed quantum privacy mechanisms and analyzed their privacy guarantees. Note that,
although Ref. [13] proposed the quantum differentially private mechanism, naively employing them
to build the quantum private Lasso estimator will lead to an unaffordable utility guarantee (see
Section 4 for details). The study [45] proposed a quantum private perceptron, which can classify
input dataset with the privacy preservation. However, the privacy metric used in [45] follows
the study [14], which is irrelevant to the notion of differential privacy and is incomparable with
our results. In addition, the proposed quantum private perceptron [45] cannot achieve any runtime
advantage. The study [44] leveraged the concept of differential privacy to protect quantum classifier
against the adversarial attack. Instead of preserving data privacy, the study [44] only focuses on
how to employ the perturbation noise, which is used in the quantum differential privacy, to preserve
the classification accuracy. The study [11] connected the concept of differential privacy to shadow
tomography. The main contribution of their study is to utilize the result of differential privacy
to tackle quantum shadow tomography problem, and shows that the required number of copies
is O((log d)2) for an unknown d-dimensional quantum state. Recently, the study [12] explored
quantum differential privacy from the perspective of learning theory. Specifically, the authors
demonstrate that the learnability of the proposed quantum statistical query learning model implies
the learnability in the quantum private probably approximately correct model. We emphasize
that, unlike the above studies, our work aims to develop a private learning algorithm that achieves
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both the quantum advantage and the provable utility guarantee. These two factors have not been
considered together before.
2 Preliminaries
We unify some basic notation throughout the whole paper. The set {1, 2, ..., n} is denoted as
[n]. Given a matrix X ∈ RN×d and a vector v ∈ RN , Xi and vi represent the i-th row of X
and the i-th entry of v, respectively. We denote the `p norm of v and X as ‖v‖p and ‖X‖p,
respectively. Specifically, the Frobenius norm for X is defined as ‖X‖F = (
∑n
i=1
∑d
j=1 |Xi,j |2)1/2.
The notation ei always refers to the i-th unit basis vector, e.g., for ei ∈ R3, e1 = [1, 0, 0]. The
identity matrix of size D × D is denoted as ID. The Laplacian distribution with variance λ is
denoted as Lapλ(x) =
1
2λe
−|x|/λ.
2.1 Convex optimization
We introduce two basic definitions in convex optimization. Refer [46] for more details.
Definition 2 (L-Lipschitz). A function f is called L-Lipschitz over a set C if for all u,w ∈ C, we
have
|f(u)− f(w)| ≤ L‖u−w‖2 . (3)
If the function f is L-Lipschitz, differentiable, and convex, then
‖∇f(u)‖2 ≤ L . (4)
Definition 3 (Curvature constant [47]). The curvature constant Cf of a convex and differentiable
function f : Rd → R with respect to a compact domain C is
Cf := sup
x,s∈C,γ∈(0,1],z=x+γ(s−x)
2
γ2
(f(z)− f(x)− 〈z − x,∇f(x)〉) . (5)
2.2 Quantum computation
We present essential background of quantum computation, i.e., quantum states, quantum oracles,
and the complexity measure. We refer to [28] for more details.
Quantum mechanics works in the Hilbert space H with H u C, where C represents the complex
Euclidean space. We use Dirac notation to denote quantum states. A pure quantum state is defined
by a vector |·〉 (named ‘ket’) with unit length. Specifically, the state |a〉 ∈ Cd is |a〉 = ∑di=1 aiei =∑d
i=1 ai |i〉 with
∑
i |ai|2 = 1, where the computation basis |i〉 stands for the unit basis vector
ei ∈ Cd. The inner product of two quantum states |a〉 and |b〉 is denoted by 〈a|b〉, where 〈a| refers
to the conjugate transpose of |a〉. We call a state |a〉 is in superposition if the number of nonzero
entries in a is larger than one. Analogous to the ‘ket’ notation, density operators can be used to
describe more general quantum states. Given a mixture of m quantum pure states |ψi〉 ∈ Cd with
probability pi and
∑m
i=1 pi = 1, the density operator ρ presents the mixed state {pi, |ψi〉}mi=1 as
ρ =
∑m
i=1 piρi with ρi = |ψi〉 〈ψi| ∈ Cd×d and Tr(ρ) = 1.
The basic element in quantum computation is the quantum bit (qubit). A qubit is a two-
dimensional quantum state, e.g., a qubit can be written as |a〉 = a1 |0〉 + a2 |1〉. Let |b〉 be an
another qubit. The quantum state represented by these two qubits is formulated by the tensor
product, i.e., |a〉⊗ |b〉 as a 4-dimensional vector. Following conventions, we can also write |a〉⊗ |b〉
as |a, b〉 or |a〉 |b〉. For clearness, we sometimes denote |a〉 |b〉 as |a〉A |b〉B, which means that the
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qubits |a〉A (|b〉B) is assigned in the quantum register A (B). The corresponding density operator
for the two qubits case is ρ = |a, b〉 〈a, b| with ρ ∈ C4×4 and Tr(ρ) = 1.
There are three typical quantum operations. The first one is quantum (logic) gates that operates
on a small number qubits. Any quantum gate corresponds to a unitary transformation and can be
stated in the circuit model, e.g., an n-qubit quantum gate U with U2
n×2n satisfies UU † = I2n . The
second one is a quantum channel, which refers to a completely positive (CP) trace-preserving map.
Given a density operator ρ ∈ Cd×d, the evolved state after applying a channel N is denoted as N (ρ),
with N (ρ) = ∑a MaρM†a and ∑a M†aMa = Id. Note that unitary is a special case of a quantum
channel. The last one is the quantum measurement, which aims to extract quantum information
such as the computation result into the classical form. Analogous to a quantum channel, the
quantum measurement is modeled by a set of operators {Kb} with
∑
b K
†
bKb = I. Given a density
operator ρ, the outcome m will be measured with the probability pm = Tr(KmρK
†
m) and the
post-measurement state will be KmρK
†
m/pm.
A quantum oracleO can be treated as a ‘black box’, which capsules a certain quantum operations
and can be used as the input to another algorithm. The quantum input model OX refers to a unitary
transformation that allows us to access the input data in superposition, i.e., denote G as a set of
indexes to be queried, we have OX(|i, j〉 |0〉) =
√|G|−1∑i,j∈G |i, j〉 |Xij〉 for any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [d].
Note that, analogous to classical computers, |Xij〉 represents the binary string of Xij . Similar rules
can be applied to Oy.
Finally, the runtime complexity of a quantum algorithm is defined as the number of elementary
operations employed in the algorithm. We use O(·) to denote the runtime complexity, or use O˜(·)
that hides the poly-logarithmic factors. We also employ the little o notation, i.e., f(n) = o(g(n)),
to denote that f(n)/g(n)→ 0.
2.3 Quantum minimum finding algorithm
A crucial technique used in our study is the quantum minimum finding algorithm (Du¨rr-Høyer’s
algorithm) [48]. Given an unordered list {f(i)}2di=1 with 2d items, the goal of the minimum finding
algorithm is to find an index k∗, i.e.,
k∗ = arg min
i
f(i) , ∀i ∈ [2d] . (6)
The theoretical result of quantum minimum finding algorithm is as follows.
Lemma 1 (Quantum minimum finding algorithm, [48]). The quantum minimum algorithm finds
the index k∗ defined in Eqn. (6) with probability at least 1/2. The corresponding runtime complexity
is 22.5
√
2d+ 1.4 log22(2d).
We follow Ref. [48] to explain the implementation of the quantum minimum finding algorithm,
summarized in Alg. 1, and refer the interested readers to Ref. [49] for the detailed explanation.
Firstly, the input of the algorithm is a quantum oracle Oˆ, i.e., Oˆ |i〉 ⊗ |0〉 = |i〉 |f(i)〉, where f(i)
refers to the i-th item of the unordered list {f(i)}2di=1, denote by T the total runtime. When T ′ < T ,
the algorithm continuously employs the Grover search to obtain the index k′ and compare f(k) and
f(k′). Once T ′ > T , the quantum minimum finding algorithm outputs k as the prediction of k∗.
A central component of the quantum minimum finding algorithm is the comparator oracle
Ocomp, which is employed to mark every item with f(i) ≤ f(k) for a given k. Mathematically,
Ocomp is defined as
Ocomp |i〉 |j〉 |0〉 = |i〉 |j〉 |g(i, j)〉 ,
where g(i, j) = 1 if f(i) ≤ f(k); otherwise, g(i, j) = 0. Note that Ocomp can be implemented
efficiently by querying the input oracle Oˆ twice.
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Algorithm 1 Quantum minimum finding algorithm (Du¨rr-Høyers algorithm) reformulated
1: Input: Oˆ ;
2: Set T = 22.5
√
2d+ 1.4 log22(2d), k ∼ [2d], and T ′ = 0 ;
3: while T ′ ≤ T do
4: Initialize the state ( 1√
2d
∑2d
i=1 |i〉R1)⊗ |k〉R2 ;
5: Use the comparator oracle Ocomp to mark every item i for which f(i) ≤ f(k) with runtime
Tˆ1 ;
6: Apply Grover search algorithm to increase the probability of the marked items with runtime
Tˆ2, and then observe the first register R1 and let k
′ be the outcome;
7: T ′ ← T ′ + Tˆ1 + Tˆ2 ;
8: If f(k′) ≤ f(k), then set k ← k′ ;
9: end while
10: Output: k
2.4 Differential privacy
We briefly introduce the definition of classical and quantum differential privacy.
Definition 4 (Classical differential privacy [50]). An algorithm A is (, δ)-differential private if
for any two neighborhood datasets X and X′ with X,X′ ∈ RN×d, and for all measurable sets
O ⊆ Range(A), the following holds:
Pr(A(X) ∈ O) ≤ e Pr(A(X′) ∈ O)+ δ. (7)
Here the neighborhood datasets X and X′ refer that the number of rows in X that need to be modified
(e.g., moved) to get the X′ is one.
Quantum differential privacy (QDP) [13] leverages similar ideas as its classical counterpart to
achieve the privacy guarantee, i.e., a certain noise is deliberately introduced to the output in order
to protect the privacy. The major difference is that, instead of using classical Gaussian or Laplacian
mechanism to introduce randomness (certain noise), QDP employs a quantum channel N to add
randomness, e.g., N can be amplitude damping, phase damping or depolarizing channel.
Denote a set of positive operator as {Πm}Mm=1 that corresponds to M different outcomes with∑
m Πm = I. Given an input state ρ and a quantum channel N , letM(ρ) be the quantum algorithm
that takes the input ρ to generate the privacy-protected quantum state N (ρ), followed by the mea-
surement Πm with m ∈ [M ]. The probability to observe the outcome m is Tr(ΠmN (ρ)). Similarly,
a subset of outcomes B ⊆ [M ] is observed with probability Pr(M(ρ) ∈ B) = ∑m∈B Tr(ΠmN (ρ)).
By leveraging the above notation, the definition of quantum differential privacy is as follows.
Definition 5 (Quantum differential privacy [13]). The quantum algorithm M is (, δ)-differential
private if for all input quantum states σ and ρ, all measurable sets B ⊆ Range(M) (equivalently,
for every Πm with m ∈ B), the following holds:
Pr(M(ρ) ∈ B) ≤ e Pr(M(σ) ∈ B) + δ. (8)
3 Quantum non-private Lasso estimator
In this section, we will devise a quantum non-private Lasso estimator that can tackle the sparse
regression learning tasks with a provable runtime speedup over its classical counterpart, i.e., the
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Frank-Wolfe algorithm that will be introduced in Section 3.1. The quantum Lasso estimator, as
the quantum generalization of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, will be elaborated in Section 3.2. The
devised quantum non-private Lasso estimator will serve as the backbone of the quantum private
Lasso (see Section 4).
3.1 Classical Frank-Wolfe algorithm
The implementation of Frank-Wolfe algorithm [51] (also known as the conditional gradient method)
is summarized in Alg. 2. Remarkably, the Frank-Wolfe algorithm and its variants, as the repre-
sentative methods to solve constrained convex optimization tasks, have been broadly used to build
the non-private Lasso estimator formulated in Eqn. (1) [47, 52, 53]. Furthermore, the study [23]
combines the non-private Lasso estimators with the Laplacian privacy mechanism to build the
differentially private Lasso estimator.
Algorithm 2 Frank-Wolfe Algorithm for Lasso [47]
1: Input: Loss function L and the constraint set C = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖ ≤ l1} ∈ Rd;
2: Randomly choose θ(1) ∈ C with only one nonzero entry;
3: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
4: ∀s ∈ [2d], α(t)s ← 〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉;
5: Compute k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s and obtain eˆk(t) ;
6: θ(t+1) ← (1− µt)θ(t) + µteˆk(t) , where µt = 2t+2 ;
7: end for
8: Output: θ(T )
Let us briefly introduce the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, following the notations used in Eqn. (1).
The Frank-Wolfe method is an iterative optimizer that solves arg minθ∈C L(θ) with C being the `1
norm ball and ‖θ‖1 ≤ l1. Since the constraint domain C is the `1 norm ball, the minimization can
be done by checking each vertex eˆs of the polytope C, where we denote the vertices set S = {eˆs}2ds=1
so that eˆs = es for 1 < s ≤ d and eˆs = −es−d for d < s ≤ 2d. In other words, the vertices set S
contains 2d unit basis vectors {±es}ds=1.
At the t-th iteration, the notation α
(t)
s in Line 4 of Alg.2 is defined as, for s ≤ d,
α(t)s :=〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉
=
1
2N
∇s
 N∑
i=1
 d∑
j=1
Xi,jθ
(t)
j − yi
2
=
1
2N
N∑
i=1
(
∂(
∑d
j=1 Xi,jθ
(t)
j − yi)2
)
∂θs
=− 1
N
n∑
i=1
Xis
(
yi − 〈Xi,θ(t)〉
)
, (9)
where the second line uses Eqn. (1). For d < s ≤ 2d, we have α(t)s = −α(t)s−d. The Frank-Wolfe
algorithm moves θ(t) towards the minimizer of the linear function, i.e.,
eˆk(t) := arg min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉 . (10)
8
Locating the minimizer eˆk(t) is accomplished in Line 5 of Alg. 2. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition
of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. Note that the updating rule of Frank-Wolfe algorithm, as shown
in Alg. 2, is a linear combination of T vertexes, which indicates that θ(T ) is sparse and at most
T -nonzero entries exist in θ(T ).
𝑒̂! , |00⟩
𝑒̂" ,|01⟩
𝑒̂# , |10⟩
𝑒̂$ , |11⟩
𝜃(")
𝜃(#) 𝜃(')𝜃(()𝜃∗
Figure 1: The mechanism of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm. The red circle refers to the optimal result θ∗. The
yellow circle refers to the trainable parameters θ(t) with t ∈ [T ]. The initial parameter θ(1) is arbitrarily
selected from the vertices set S, e.g., eˆ1. The grey dash line represents the location of the minimizer eˆk(t)
at the t-th iteration (Step 4-5 in Alg. 2), i.e., eˆk(t) := arg mineˆs∈S〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉. The blue solid line denotes
the updating rule from θ(t−1) to θ(t), i.e., Line 6 in Alg. 2.
The Frank-Wolfe algorithm is robust to noise in the following sense. Instead of calculating the
exact solution eˆk(t) as shown in Eqn. (10), employing any approximated solution eˆk˜(t) ∈ S (e.g.,
obtained by a noisy solver), where eˆk˜(t) is sampled from a certain distribution P , to update the
learning parameters θ(t) can also promise the convergence of Frank-Wolfe algorithm, as long as
eˆk˜(t) satisfies the following relation,
Eeˆ
k˜(t)
∼P
[
〈eˆk˜(t) ,∇L(θ(t))〉
]
≤ min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉+ 1
2
ϑµtCf , (11)
where Cf is the curvature constant formulated in Definition 3, µt is the learning rate, and
1
2ϑµtCf
refers to the additive approximation quality in the step t with ϑ ≥ 0 being an arbitrary fixed error
parameter [47]. The following proposition quantifies the convergence rate of Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 1, [47]). Let {eˆk˜(1) , ..., eˆk˜(T )} be a sequence of vectors from S with θ(t+1) =
(1− µt)θ(t) + µteˆk˜(t), such that for all t ∈ [T ], Eqn. (11) is satisfied. Then the result θ(T ) satisfies
RL ≤ 2Cf
T + 2
(1 + ϑ) . (12)
We emphasize that, although the original proof of Proposition 1 [47, Appendix A] only takes
account of the deterministic case, it can be easily extended to the expectation setting given in
Eqn. (11). Proposition 1 implies that the only difference between the exact (i.e., eˆk(t) = eˆk˜(t) and
ϑ = 0) and approximate scenarios (i.e., eˆk(t) 6= eˆk˜(t) and ϑ > 0) is that the utility bound of the
latter is slightly worse than the former. Moreover, under the exact setting, Lasso achieves the
utility bound O(Cfζ) when T = O(1/ζ).
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We end this subsection with the optimal (lower bound) runtime complexity of classical non-
private Lasso with the input model formulated in Definition 1.
Lemma 2. Given the input model formulated in Definition 1, the runtime complexity of the classical
non-private and differentially private Lasso is lower bounded by Ω(N + d).
Proof of Lemma 2. The study [26] proves that, given the input model formulated in Definition 1,
the optimal runtime for the support vector machine (SVM) is Ω(N + d). Moreover, under the
same setting of the input model, the study [54] proves the equivalence between SVM and Lasso.
Alternatively, the optimal runtime for Lasso is Ω(N + d).
Recall that differential privacy mechanisms [55] cannot reduce the runtime complexity. There-
fore, the lower bound runtime for private Lasso is at least Ω(N + d).
3.2 Quantum non-private Lasso estimator
Our main technical contribution here is proposing a quantum version of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm
to build a quantum Lasso estimator. The implementation of the quantum Lasso estimator is
summarized in Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 Quantum Lasso estimator
1: Input: Loss function L, the constraint set C = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖ ≤ l1} ∈ Rd ;
2: Randomly choose θ(1) ∈ C with only one nonzero entry ;
3: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
4: Apply oracle Oα(t) to prepare a quantum state
∣∣α(t)〉 defined in Eqn. (13), see Theorem 3 ;
5: Employ quantum minimum finding algorithm (see Corollary 2) and the state
∣∣α(t)〉 to obtain
classical output k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s , or equivalently, eˆk(t) ;
6: θ(t+1) ← (1− µt)θ(t) + µteˆk(t) , where µt = 2t+2 ;
7: end for
8: Output: θ(T )
There are two steps of our proposal that differ with its classical counterpart (Alg. 2); namely, the
construction of the oracle Oα(t) , and the employment of the quantum minimum finding algorithm
to find eˆk(t) . These two steps enable the quantum Lasso estimator to quadratically reduce the
runtime complexity to find eˆk(t) for any t ∈ [T ]. The following theorem describes the overall
runtime complexity to implement the quantum non-private Lasso estimator.
Theorem 2. Denote ς as the error parameter. Given access to OX and Oy formulated in Definition
1, with successful probability 1− o(1), the quantum Lasso as described in Alg. 3 after T = O(1/ζ)
iterations outputs θ(T ) with the utility bound RL ≤ O(ζCf + ς) in O˜(
√
Nd/(ζ3ς)) runtime complex-
ity.
The proof of Theorem 2 will be given at the end of this subsection. Compared with Lemma 2,
the proposed quantum non-private Lasso achieves the quadratical runtime speedup over the optimal
classical Lasso in terms of the feature dimension d. Moreover, the achieved runtime complexity of
quantum non-private Lasso is nearly optimal when N  d, supported by the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The runtime complexity of the quantum non-private (or private) Lasso is lower
bounded by Ω(
√
N +
√
d).
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Proof of Corollary 1. The proof of this corollary follows Lemma 2 closely. Given the input model
formulated in Definition 1, the lower bound of quantum SVM is Ω(
√
N +
√
d) [3]. In favor of
the equivalence between Lasso and SVM [54], then the runtime lower bound of the corresponding
quantum Lasso is also Ω(
√
N +
√
d).
We next elaborate how to implement Line 4 and Line 5 of Alg. 3.
State preparation (Line 4). This step aims to build the oracle Oα(t) that encodes the classical
vector α(t) in Eqn. (9) into the quantum state to earn the runtime speedup. The runtime cost of
implementing Oα(t) is as follows, and we provide the proof detail in Appendix A.
Theorem 3 (State preparation). Given access to quantum input oracles OX and Oy, the state
preparation oracle Oα(t), which prepares an estimated state
∣∣α˜(t)〉 with successful probability 1− 2b
and b ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
Oα(t) : |0〉 →
∣∣∣α˜(t)〉 := 1√
2d
2d∑
s=1
|s〉I
∣∣∣α˜(t)s 〉 , (13)
can be constructed in O˜(T 2
√
N/ς) runtime, where |α(t)s −α˜(t)s | ≤ ς for any s ∈ [2d], and the runtime
hides a poly-logarithmical term O(log(1/b)).
Notice that the runtime complexity to obtain the classical vector α(t) is at least O(Nd) due to
the multiplication of X> ∈ Rd×N and (y−Xθ(t)) ∈ RN . In contrast, the runtime of our algorithm
to prepare the estimated state
∣∣α˜(t)〉 is O˜(T 2√N/ς) and is independent of the feature dimension
d. Since T  d in most practical scenarios, this result indicates the efficacy to prepare the state∣∣α˜(t)〉 instead of directly computing classical form α(t), and enables the quantum Lasso to earn the
runtime speedup over the classical Lasso.
Find eˆk(t) (Line 5). Given access to the oracle Oα(t) , we can directly employ the quantum
minimum finding algorithm [48] to find k(t), or equivalently, eˆk(t) . We summarize the runtime
complexity to find eˆk(t) below, and leave the proof details in Appendix B.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the the state preparation oracle Oα(t) can be implemented in Tα runtime.
With successful probability at least 1/2, the classical output eˆk(t) can be obtained in O˜(Tα
√
d)
runtime. The successful probability can be boosted to 1− 1/2c by repeating the quantum minimum
finding algorithm c times.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Error analysis and utility bound. The error of quantum Lasso comes from
the two subroutines, Line 4 and Line 5, respectively. First, the state preparation oracle Oα(t) only
generates an approximated state
∣∣α˜(t)〉 with successful probability 1 − 2b and b ∈ [0, 1], as stated
in the proof of Theorem 3. Second, the quantum minimum finding algorithm can only locate the
index that corresponds to the minimum entry of α˜(t) with successful probability 1−1/2c, as shown
in Corollary 2.
Since the quantum minimum finding algorithm queries the oracle Oα(t) at most
√
2d times as
illustrated in Section 2, the probability that the state
∣∣α˜(t)〉 can always be successfully prepared in
all
√
2d queries is (1 − 2b)
√
2d. Overall, the successful probability to obtain eˆk˜(t) is (1 − 1/2c)(1 −
2b)
√
2d, where the index k˜(t) is defined as
k˜(t) = arg min
s∈[2d]
α˜(t) . (14)
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Since there are in total T iterations in the quantum Lasso algorithm, the successful probability to
collect {eˆk˜(t)}Tt=1 is (
(1− 1/2c)(1− 2b)
√
2d
)T
= (1− 2b)T (1− 2b)
√
2dT , (15)
where c = dlog2(1/2b)e. Eqn. (15) can be simplified as
(1− 2b)T (1+
√
2d) ≥ 1− 1/κ = 1− o(1), (16)
where we choose b = 1
κT (
√
2d+1)
, κ > 0. The inequality uses (1 + x/n)n ≥ 1 + x for n > 1 and
|x| ≤ n (x and n correspond to −1/κ and T (√2d+1), respectively). In other words, with successful
probability 1− o(1), we can collect {eˆk˜(t)}Tt=1.
We then analyze of the utility bound of quantum Lasso when the collected basis vectors are
{eˆk˜(t)}Tt=1 with T = O(1/ζ). Followed from Theorem 3 and the definition of k(t) as formulated in
Line 5 of Alg. 3, we have
α
(t)
k˜(t)
≤ α˜(t)
k˜(t)
+ ς ≤ α˜(t)
k(t)
+ ς ≤ α(t)
k(t)
+ 2ς , (17)
where the first inequality uses |α(t)
k˜(t)
− α˜(t)
k˜(t)
| ≤ ς, the second inequality comes from the fact α˜(t)
k˜(t)
=
mins∈[2d] α˜
(t)
s ≤ α˜(t)k(t) , and the last inequality employs |α
(t)
k(t)
− α˜(t)
k(t)
| ≤ ς. By expanding α(t)
k˜(t)
and
α
(t)
k(t)
with their explicit forms, we obtain the following relation, i.e.,
α
(t)
k˜(t)
≤ α(t)
k(t)
+ 2ς ⇔ 〈eˆk˜(t) ,∇L(θ(t))〉 ≤ mineˆs∈S〈eˆs,∇L(θ
(t))〉+ 2ς . (18)
In conjunction with Eqn. (11) and (18), we can choose ϑ = 4ςµtCf . Finally, Proposition 1 yields
RL ≤ 2Cf
T + 2
(1 + ϑ) ≤ 2Cf
T
+ 4ς = O(ζCf + ς) , (19)
where the second inequality employs µt = 2/(T + 2), T = O(1/ζ) and ϑ =
4ς
µtCf
.
Runtime analysis. We then analyze the runtime complexity of each iteration, which can be
efficiently obtained from Theorem 3 and Corollary 2. As shown in Theorem 3, the runtime of
using the oracle Oα(t) to prepare the state
∣∣α(t)〉 is Tα = O˜((T 2√N)/ς). Note that we omit the
influence of b in the runtime analysis of quantum Lasso, since the runtime to prepare Oα(t) only
has a logarithmic dependence in terms of b. Following the results in the error analysis, at the t-th
iteration, by repeatedly querying the quantum minimum finding algorithm c = dlog2(1/2b)e times,
the target basis vectors eˆk˜(t) that k˜
(t) satisfies Eqn. (14) can be collected with successful probability
1− o(1). Therefore, based on the claim of Corollary 2, the runtime to find eˆk˜(t) is O˜(cTα
√
d). The
runtime of quantum Lasso with T iterations is therefore O˜(cTTα
√
d). By exploiting the explicit
form of T = O(1/ζ), Tα = O˜((T
2
√
N)/ς), and c = dlog2(1/2b)e, the runtime complexity of quantum
Lasso is then equal to
O˜(
√
Nd/(ζ3ς)) .
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4 Quantum private Lasso estimator
The outline of this section is as follows. In Subsection 4.1, we illustrate the first quantum private
Lasso estimator by integrating a classical differential privacy mechanism with the quantum non-
private Lasso, inspired by the study [23]. We prove that the utility bound of the proposed quantum
private Lasso estimator is nearly optimal, while its runtime cost is huge. To achieve the runtime
speedup, in Subsection 4.2, we propose the second quantum private Lasso estimator by combining
the quantum differential privacy mechanism with the quantum non-private Lasso. However, its
utility bound may not converge. Next, in Subsection 4.3, we devise the third quantum private
Lasso by leveraging the adaptive privacy mechanism, and show that its runtime is better than the
classical DP Lasso algorithms while retaining a nearly optimal utility bound. Last, in Subsection
4.4, we discuss the possibility to implement the third proposal on near-term quantum devices.
The following table provides a quick summary of the main conclusion in this section.
Classical [23] Q-Laplacian Q-Depolarization Q-Adaptive
Runtime cost O((N)2/3) O˜((N)2/3d3/2) O˜( 
2N1/2
d3/2
) O˜(2N3/2d1/2)
Utility bound O˜( 1
(N)2/3
) O˜( 1
(N)2/3
) O(d
2/3
2/3
) O˜( 1
(N)2/3
)
Table 1: Comparison of different (, δ)-DP algorithms for Lasso. We only illustrate on how the runtime cost
and utility bound depend on the input size N , the feature dimension d, and the privacy budget . The label
‘Classical’, ‘Q-Laplacian’, ‘Q-Depolarization’, and ‘Quantum-Adaptive’ refer to the classical private Lasso
(Lemma 3), quantum private Lasso with Laplacian privacy mechanism (Alg. 4), quantum private Lasso with
depolarization privacy mechanism (Alg. 5), and quantum private Lasso with the adaptive privacy mechanism
(Alg. 6), respectively.
4.1 Quantum private Lasso estimator with classical Laplacian noise
The differentially private Lasso estimator aims to obtain the optimal parameters defined in Eqn. (1)
with the privacy preservation. To achieve the privacy promise, the study [23] replaced the index
searching step, i.e., k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s , in the non-private Lasso algorithm (Line 5 of Alg. 2)
by
k(t) = arg min
s∈[2d]
(
α(t)s + υ
(t)
s
)
,
where {υ(t)s }s∈[2d] are noise samples drawn from the Laplacian distribution Lapλ(x) with λ being
the variance. The randomness introduced by Laplacian noise enables the developed private Lasso
to achieve the differentially private property with the nearly optimal utility bound [23].
Lemma 3 (Modified from Theorem 3.1, [23]). Following the same notations used in Eqn. (1), with
setting the variance of Laplacian distribution as λ =
L1
√
T log(1/δ)
N and L1 being the Lipschitz con-
stant of L, the classical private Lasso estimator proposed by [23] after T = O
(
(N)2/3
L
2/3
1
)
iterations
is (, δ)-differentially private and achieves the nearly optimal utility bound, i.e., RL ≤ O˜( 1(N)2/3 ).
The runtime complexity to execute this algorithm is O(N5/3d).
Motivated by the classical proposal [23], our first quantum private Lasso estimator is constructed
by combining the Laplacian noise with the quantum non-private Lasso estimator. We summarize
the implementation of this quantum private Lasso estimator in Alg. 4. Specifically, instead of
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preparing
∣∣α(t)〉 and searching the index that corresponds to the minimum entry of α(t) as shown
in Line 4-5 of Algorithm 3, the quantum private Lasso estimator prepares the state
∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉
and searches the index that corresponds to the minimum entry of α(t) + υ(t), where υ(t) ∈ R2d is
the noise vector that is sampled from the Laplacian distribution Lapλ(x).
Algorithm 4 Quantum private Lasso estimator with Laplacian privacy mechanism
1: Given the privacy parameters (, δ).
Following the same notations and implementation rules in Algorithm 3, except replacing Line
4-5 with the following lines.
2: Sample the noise vector v(t) with v
(t)
s ∼ Lapλ(x) for all s ∈ [2d] and λ = L1
√
T log(1/δ)
N , compute
the classical vector α(t) + v(t), and then prepare a quantum state
∣∣α(t) + v(t)〉 ;
3: Employ the quantum minimum finding algorithm (see Corollary 2) to the state
∣∣α(t) + v(t)〉 to
obtain the classical output k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s + v(t), or equivalently, eˆk(t) ;
The utility bound and the runtime cost of the proposed quantum private Lasso, Alg. 4, is as
follows, and its proof is provided in Appendix C.
Theorem 4. Let L1 as the Lipschitz constant of L. With successful probability 1 − o(1), after
T = O
(
(N)2/3
L
2/3
1
)
iterations, the quantum private Lasso in Alg. 4 is (, δ)-differentially private and
achieves the utility bound RL ≤ O˜( 1(N)2/3 ) in O˜
(
2/3N5/2d+N2/32/3d3/2
)
runtime.
The achieved results in Theorem 4 indicate that the combination of the classical differential
privacy mechanism and the quantum non-private Lasso estimator can reach the nearly optimal
utility bound, supported by Lemma 3. However, its runtime complexity is worse than that of the
classical private Lasso given in Lemma 3 for practical scenarios N  d. The above observation
reflects the difficulty to design quantum private learning algorithms because naively introducing
conventional differentially private mechanisms into quantum non-private algorithms may collapse
the attained runtime speedup.
Intuitively, the utility bounds in Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 are identical since both the classical
and quantum private Lasso inject Laplacian noise with the same variance to the non-private Frank-
Wolfe algorithm. The runtime analysis of the quantum private Lasso is analogous to the non-
private case in Theorem 2, where we first examine the runtime cost at each iteration and then
multiply this runtime by a factor of T iterations. Without loss of generality, we focus on the
runtime cost at the t-th iteration, where this runtime cost is dominated by three operations, i.e.,
the computation of the classical vector α(t) + υ(t), the construction of the quantum oracle that
prepares the state
∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉, and the execution of the quantum minimum finding algorithm.
Unlike the quantum non-private Lasso, the quantum private Lasso as shown in Alg. 4 requests
an extra preprocessing step to compute α(t) + υ(t), since directly employing the quantum oracles
OX and Oy cannot generate the state
∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉. The runtime cost to obtain α(t) + υ(t) is at
least O(Nd) because, as discussed in Subsection 3.2, the calculation of α(t) takes O(Nd) runtime.
Moreover, the construction of the noise vector υ(t) takes O(d) runtime. Once the dense vector
α(t) + υ(t) ∈ Rd is prepared, the corresponding quantum state ∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉 can be generated in
O(d) runtime (confer the proof of Theorem 4 for details). Hurdled by the inefficiency to prepare the
state
∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉 (i.e., the runtime complexity depends on the feature dimension d), the runtime
complexity to implement the quantum minimum finding algorithm is dramatically increased. In
particular, by generalizing the statement of Corollary 2, it can be proved that the runtime to locate
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the target index k(t) (Line 3 of Alg. 4) is O˜(d3/2). Overall, the consumed time at the t-th iteration
is O˜(Nd+ d3/2). The runtime in Theorem 4 then follows by choosing T = O
(
(N)2/3
L
2/3
1
)
.
Remark 1. Let us further explain the hardness to design a quantum private Lasso estimator from
the technical point of view. The strategies to assign the differential privacy to a learning algorithm
can be classified into three categories, i.e., objective perturbation, output perturbation, and gradient
perturbation. However, the objective and output perturbations, where a certain amount of noise
is injected into L or θ, cannot be employed to design private Lasso estimators, since the non-
smooth property of Lasso forbids us to analyze how the involved noise affects the utility bounds.
Therefore, the gradient perturbation, which injects a noise vector with 2d dimensions into the
gradient ∇L(θ(t)), is the only choice to devise private Lasso estimators. Recall that the aim of
the quantum private Lasso is achieving the runtime speedup and a low utility bound. Encoding
the non-sparse noise vector with 2d entries into quantum states requests O(d) runtime complexity,
which collapses the runtime speedup attained by the quantum non-private Lasso.
4.2 Quantum private Lasso estimator with quantum depolarization noise
Although the utility bound is nearly optimal, the first proposal of the quantum private Lasso
estimator in subsection 4.1 requires a higher runtime cost than its classical counterpart, due to the
inefficiency of encoding an Laplacian noise vector into the quantum states. Besides the classical
privacy mechanisms, the study [13] has investigated how to employ quantum depolarization noise in
Definition 6 below to attain the differential privacy, because its implementation only requires O(1)
quantum operations [56, 57]. Driven by the implementation efficacy, the goal in this subsection is
to devise a quantum private Lasso estimator with the quantum depolarization noise and quantify
its utility bound and runtime cost.
Definition 6 (Quantum depolarization channel). Given a quantum state ρ ∈ Cd×d, the quantum
depolarization channel Ep that acts on this state is defined as
Ep(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ ppid , (20)
where p is the depolarization rate, and pid is the maximally mixed state with pid = Id/d.
The randomness of quantum depolarization privacy mechanism is as follows. The depolarization
channel Ep(ρ) outputs ρ with the probability 1 − p; or outputs the maximally mixed state pid
otherwise [28].
Denote the output state of the comparator Ocomp in the quantum minimum finding algorithm,
introduced in subsection 2.3, as
Ocomp :
∣∣k′〉 ∣∣∣k(t)〉 |0〉 → ∣∣∣Φ(k′, k(t))〉 ≡ ∣∣k′〉r1 ∣∣∣k(t)〉r2
∣∣∣g(k′, k(t))〉
r3
, (21)
where g(k′, k(t)) = 1 if αk′ ≤ αk(t) and g(k′, k(t)) = 0, otherwise. To assign the privacy promise to
quantum Lasso, the most suitable choice is injecting the depolarization noise into
∣∣Φ(k′, k(t))〉. The
implementation of the quantum private Lasso estimator with depolarization noise is summarized
in Alg. 5. The proposed quantum private Lasso substitutes Line 5 of Alg. 3 with Line 3-5 of Alg. 5.
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Algorithm 5 Quantum private Lasso estimator with the depolarization noise
1: Following the same notations and implementation rules in Algorithm 3, except replacing Line
5 with the following line.
2: Apply the quantum minimum finding algorithm to the state
∣∣α(t)〉 to obtain the classical output
k(t) with k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s ;
3: Employ Ocomp to generate the state
∣∣Φ(k′, k(t))〉 defined in Eqn. (21).
4: Apply the depolarization channel Ep to the state
∣∣Φ(k′, k(t))〉;
5: Let K(t) = k(t) be the selected index; Observe the quantum register r3 to obtain g(k
′, k(t)), and
set K(t) = k′ iff g(k′, k(t)) = 1;
6: Let the selected basis vector be eˆK(t) .
We now analyze the privacy guarantee of the quantum private Lasso with depolarization noise
whose proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 5 (Privacy guarantee). The quantum private Lasso, as illustrated in Alg. 5, achieves
(, δ)-differential privacy after T iterations, with the depolarization channel Ep, where
 =
√
2T ln(1/δ) ln
(
1 +
4d(1− p2)
p
)
. (22)
Finally, the utility guarantee and runtime complexity of our quantum private Lasso estimator
is stated as follows. The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 6 (Utility guarantee and runtime complexity). Let L1 as the Lipschitz constant of L.
With successful probability 1−o(1), after T = O
(
2/3
d2/3 ln1/3(1/δ)L
2/3
1
)
iterations, the quantum private
Lasso as illustrated in Alg. 5 achieves the utility bound
RL = O˜
(
d2/3
2/3
+ ς
)
, (23)
in the runtime
O˜
(
2N1/2
d3/2ς
)
, (24)
where Cf is the curvature constant and L1 is the Lipschitz constant of L.
Although the quantum private Lasso estimator with the depolarization noise in Alg. 5 seems to
reduce the runtime cost, its applicability is questionable because its utility bound RL in Eqn. (23)
is polynomially increasing with respect to d. Moreover, the denominator of this utility bound is
independent of the input size N , which means that increasing N cannot promise a converging utility
bound, while the utility bounds in Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 will converge to zero, when N →∞.
This poor utility bound indicates that directly combining the quantum depolarization noise into
the quantum non-private algorithm will not work.
We remark that injecting quantum depolarization noise to other subroutines in the quantum
non-private Lasso, Alg. 3, will also fail. In particular, if we inject the depolarization noise into
Grover search oracles (i.e., each ideal unitary operation used in Grover search is followed by a
depolarization channel), which are employed in the quantum minimum finding algorithm, the run-
time cost to search the target index will dramatically increase with respected to the increasing error
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rate. Specifically, Ref. [58] proved that the ‘quadratic speedup’ of the Grover search is only available
when the depolarization rate satisfies p < 1/
√
d, where d refers to the length of the searching list.
Otherwise, the runtime cost of the Grover search will scale as O(dp). In addition, if we inject the
depolarization noise into the prepared state
∣∣α(t)〉, the privacy budget  will polynomially increase
in terms of the feature dimension d, due to the following reason. In particular, the composition
property of differential privacy [50] states that, given a set of mechanisms {Mi}ki=1, where Mi is
(i, δi)-differentially private for i ∈ [k], their composition is (
∑k
i=1 i,
∑k
i=1 δi)-differentially private.
When the depolarization privacy mechanism is applied to the state
∣∣α(t)〉 to attain (, δ)-differential
privacy, since the quantum minimum finding algorithm continuously queries
∣∣α(t)〉 with O(√d)
times, the composition property implies that the output of the algorithm is (O(
√
d), O(
√
dδ))-
differentially private.
4.3 Quantum private Lasso with the adaptive privacy mechanism
The two proposals of quantum private Lasso as shown in previous subsections, which directly
interact the classical or quantum differential privacy mechanism with quantum non-private Lasso,
fail to achieve the runtime speedup with a reasonable utility bound. These results raise a question:
whether there exists a quantum private Lasso estimator that can meet the two standard rules of
the quantum private learning algorithms design. In this subsection, we provide a positive response.
Instead of using the aforementioned classical and quantum privacy mechanism, we devise an
adaptive privacy mechanism and then combine it with the quantum non-private Lasso to obtain
the quantum private Lasso. The implementation of this proposal is summarized in Alg. 6.
Algorithm 6 Quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism
1: Input: Loss function L, the constraint set C = {θ ∈ Rd : ‖θ‖ ≤ l1} ∈ Rd, the Lipschitz
constant L1, the constant p, and a threshold ∆ (See Lemma 4) ;
2: Randomly choose θ(1) ∈ C with only one nonzero entry ;
3: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
4: Apply the oracle Oα(t) to prepare the state
∣∣α(t)〉 with setting ς = ∆/4 (See Eqn. (13)) ;
5: Repeatedly apply the quantum minimum finding algorithm to collect an index set K that
corresponds to the last d3 + 16N∆e minimum entries of the vector α(t) ;
6: Let K(t) be the selected index; With probability 1 − p, set K(t) = k(t) := arg mins∈[2d]α(t)s ;
Otherwise, uniformly sample an index k′ from K and set K(t) = k′ ;
7: Let the selected basis vector be eˆK(t) ;
8: θ(t+1) ← (1− µt)θ(t) + µteˆK(t) , where µt = 2t+2 ;
9: end for
We now present the privacy guarantee of Alg. 6 whose proof is given in Appendix F.
Theorem 7 (Privacy guarantee). Assuming |α(t)s −α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for s, q ∈ [2d] and s 6= q, the quantum
private Lasso, as illustrated in Alg. 6, achieves (, δ)-differential privacy after T iterations, where
 =
√
2T ln(1/δ) ln
(
1 +
1− p
p
(
4 +
16
N∆
))
. (25)
The utility guarantee and runtime complexity of the proposed quantum private Lasso estimator
are stated as follows.
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Theorem 8 (Utility guarantee and runtime complexity). Let L1 as the Lipschitz constant of L.
Assuming |α(t)s − α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for s, q ∈ [2d] and s 6= q, with successful probability 1 − o(1), after
T = O
(
(N∆)2/3
L
2/3
1 ln
1/3(1/δ)
)
iterations, the quantum private Lasso as illustrated in Alg. 6 achieves the
utility bound
RL ≤ O˜
(
1
(N∆)2/3
)
, (26)
in the runtime
O˜
(
2N3/2d1/2
)
. (27)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix G. Since the optimal runtime of the classical
private Lasso is Ω(N + d) as shown in Lemma 3, the proposed quantum private Lasso estimator
achieves the runtime speedup when N < O(d1/3). Moreover, the utility bound of the proposed
quantum private Lasso estimator is nearly optimal, because it has been proved that the optimal
utility bound of private Lasso is Ω(1/(N logN)2/3) [23].
Our main technique contribution is proposing an adaptive privacy mechanism. As explained in
Remark 1, the only way to assign the privacy promise to Lasso is the gradient perturbation. How-
ever, naively injecting the classical Laplacian noise or the quantum depolarization noise to the state∣∣α(t)〉, which contains the gradient information in the quantum non-private Lasso, either collapses
the runtime speedup (Theorem 4) or leads to an increasing utility bound (Theorem 6). To reach
both the runtime and utility advances, the adaptive privacy mechanism exerts the perturbation on
the classical side, i.e., the output basis vector eˆk(t) .
Before moving on to elaborate the proposed privacy mechanism, we first unify the required
notations. Let the neighborhood dataset of D be D′ = {X′,y′} with ‖X′‖F ≤ 1 and ‖y′‖1 ≤ 1
(analogous to the setting in Eqn. (1)). Denote the corresponding gradient projections for D′ as
α′(t), where α′(t)s = 〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t), D′)〉 that can be computed following Eqn. (9) for all s ∈ [2d]. One
crucial observation is that the difference between α
(t)
s and the corresponding entry α
′(t)
s , for any
s ∈ [2d] is bounded. In particular, the difference of α(t)s and α′(t)s for each entry s ∈ [2d] is at most
|α(t)s −α′(t)s |
=
∣∣∣∣∣− 1N
n∑
i=1
Xis
(
yi − 〈Xi,θ(t)〉
)
+
1
N
n∑
i=1
X′is
(
y′i − 〈X′i,θ(t)〉
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N
|Xks|
∣∣∣yk − 〈Xk,θ(t)〉∣∣∣+ 1
N
∣∣X′ks∣∣ ∣∣∣y′k − 〈X′k,θ(t)〉∣∣∣
≤ 1
N
|Xks| (|yk|+
∣∣∣〈Xk,θ(t)〉∣∣∣) + 1
N
|Xks| (
∣∣y′k∣∣+ ∣∣∣〈X′k,θ(t)〉∣∣∣)
≤ 1
N
‖X‖F (1 + ‖X‖F ) + 1
N
‖X′‖F (1 + ‖X′‖F )
≤ 4
N
. (28)
The first equality in Eqn. (28) comes from Eqn. (9). The first inequality employs the triangle
inequality and the fact that only one example, said the k-th example, in D and D′ is varied. The
second inequality uses the triangle inequality. The third inequality is guaranteed by the facts that
|Xks| ≤ ‖X‖F , |X′ks| ≤ ‖X′‖F , |yk| ≤ ‖y‖ ≤ 1, |y′k| ≤ ‖y′‖ ≤ 1, and ‖Xk‖‖θ(t)‖ ≤ ‖X‖F and
‖X′k‖‖θ(t)‖ ≤ ‖X′‖F (due to ‖θ(t)‖ ≤ 1, see Eqn. (1)). The last inequality exploits the results
‖X‖F ≤ 1 and ‖X′‖F ≤ 1. The discrepancy as shown in Eqn. (28) indicates that the entry α′(t)s
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can be treated as adding a bounded noise Λ to α
(t)
s for all s ∈ [2d], i.e., α′(t)s = α(t)s + Λ ,with Λ ∈
[− 4N , 4N ].
The key idea behind the proposed adaptive privacy mechanism is that the differential privacy
can be achieved by adding randomness to a subset, denoted by K, in α(t) instead of all 2d entries.
The goal here is to determine how big the size |K| is while the differential privacy in Definition 4
can be achieved. Essentially, the set K contains all the indices, say k, whose gradient projection
α
′(t)
k in the new neighborhood dataset D
′ will have a non-zero probability of becoming the minimal
entry. If otherwise, we can ignore those indices because the quantum minimum finding algorithm
will have zero probability of choosing them. Formally, we define the set K to be
K =
{
k|α(t)k −
4
N
< α
(t)
1 +
4
N
}
. (29)
With the definition of K, we will have, for ` 6∈ K
α
′(t)
` ≥ α(t)` −
4
N
≥ α(t)1 +
4
N
≥ α′(t)1 . (30)
This condition allows us to bound the size K ≡ |K| as follows. Choose K = d 8N∆ + 1e, and for any
` > K
α
(t)
` −
4
N
≥ (K − 1)∆ +α(t)1 −
4
N
≥ α(t)1 +
4
N
. (31)
The first inequality uses the assumption that |α(t)s −α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for s 6= q and the set {α(t)k } is sorted.
The second inequality uses K = d 8N∆ + 1e.
We next analyze how the error term ς in the state preparation step influences the cardinality of
K. Because the state preparation oracle Oα(t) only generates the approximated state α˜(t), where
each entry |α˜(t)s −α(t)s | ≤ ς. By choosing ς = ∆/4 in Alg. 6, we have
|α˜(t)s − α˜(t)q | ≥
∆
2
, ∀s, q ∈ [2d], s 6= q . (32)
Moreover, analogous to Eqn. (28), we have∣∣∣α˜(t)s − α˜′(t)s ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣α˜(t)s −α(t)s +α(t)s −α′(t)s +α′(t)s − α˜′(t)s ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣α˜(t)s −α(t)s ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣α˜′(t)s −α′(t)s ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣α(t)s −α′(t)s ∣∣∣
≤∆
2
+
4
N
, (33)
where the first inequality uses the triangle inequality, and the second inequality employs |α˜(t)s −
α
(t)
s | ≤ ς, |α˜′(t)s −α′(t)s | ≤ ς, ς = ∆/4, and Eqn. (28).
Following the same routine as the ideal setting does, we can connect Eqn. (32) and Eqn. (33)
to bound the cardinality of the set K. Without loss of generality, we can assume that {α˜(t)k }2dk=1
are in increasing order; namely, α˜
(t)
1 ≤ · · · ≤ α˜(t)2d . Define
K =
{
k|α˜(t)k −
4
N
− ∆
2
< α˜
(t)
1 +
4
N
+
∆
2
}
. (34)
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This condition enables us to bound K = |K|, similar to Eqn. (31). In particular, choosing K =
d3 + 16N∆e, for any ` > K, we have
α˜
(t)
` −
4
N
− ∆
2
≥ (K − 1)∆
2
+ α˜
(t)
1 −
4
N
− ∆
2
≥ α˜(t)1 +
4
N
+
∆
2
. (35)
The first inequality uses Eqn. (32) and the last inequality uses K = d3 + 16N∆e.
The following lemma summarizes the explicit relation between N and |K|, as the precondition
to prove the differential privacy of the proposed Lasso estimator.
Lemma 4 (Adaptive privacy mechanism). Assume that for any two indexes s and k, the gap of the
corresponding two entries is upper bounded by ∆, i.e., |α(t)s −α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for any t ∈ [T ], s, q ∈ [2d],
and s 6= q. Denote the index set K that collects all possible outputs of the quantum minimum finding
algorithm as shown in Line 5 of Alg. 6. The cardinality of K satisfies
|K| = d3 + 16
N∆
e . (36)
4.4 Implementation on near-term quantum devices
The implementation of the quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism
can be divided into three parts, i.e., the input process, the quantum computation process, and the
output process. Recall the workflow of the proposed quantum private Lasso in Alg. 6. The trainable
parameter θ(t) is the only component that is required to be continuously read-in and read-out.
Celebrated by the sparsity of θ(t) for all t ∈ [T ], and the available quantum input oracles OX and
Oy, the input and output processes of the quantum private Lasso can be very efficient, which assures
that the quantum private Lasso estimator could avoid the input and output bottleneck [59]. For the
quantum computation procedure, the key ingredient is the quantum minimum finding algorithm,
which is employed to locate the index corresponding to the minimum entry of α(t). Theoretical
studies have validated the feasibility to implement the quantum minimum finding algorithm on
noisy quantum devices [49]. Overall, the quantum private Lasso estimator (at least in prototype)
can be effectively realized on near-term quantum devices.
5 Numerical simulations
In this section, we validate the performance of the quantum private Lasso estimator using the
synthetic dataset. We choose the reconstruction error, i.e., ‖θp − θ∗‖2/‖θ‖2 that θp is the output
of the employed private Lasso estimator, as the metric to evaluate the utility guarantee. In the
following experiments, we repeat each setting 10 times and then compute the average reconstruction
error.
The construction rule of the synthetic dataset X ∈ Rn×d is as follows. Each entry of X is drawn
i.i.d. from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1), and the s∗ non-zero entries of the optimal parameters
θ∗ is drawn i.i.d. from U(0, 1). Based on such a construction rule, we build two synthetic datasets
D(1) = (X(1),y(1)) ∈ (R400×1000,R400) and D(2) = (X(2),y(2)) ∈ (R1000×5000,R1000) with s∗ = 10 to
compare the performance of different private learning methods. The value of the privacy budget 
is ranging from 0.1 to 5.
We separately apply the quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism
and the classical private Lasso estimator [23] to study the synthetic dataset D(1) and D(2). Figure 2
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Figure 2: The simulation results for the private Lasso estimator. The labels ‘Q Adp’ and ‘C Lap’ refer to
the quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism formulated in Alg.6 and the
classical private Lasso estimator formulated in Lemma 3, respectively. The label ‘Baseline’ corresponds to
the non-private Lasso result formulated in Alg. 2. The left panel and the right panel separately illustrate
the reconstruction error for the synthetic datasets D(1) and D(2).
illustrates the simulation results. In particular, for both D(1) and D(2), the reconstruction error of
the quantum private Lasso is continuously decreasing with respect to the increased privacy budget
. Moreover, the quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive privacy mechanism achieves
a comparable performance as the classical private Lasso estimator (Lemma 3).
6 Conclusion
Recall that the major challenge of NISQ devices is that the quantum gates are always accompanied
with unavoidable system noise [10, 60]; hence it prohibits advanced quantum learning algorithms
such as HHL and its variants [33, 61–63] to run on NISQ devices with advantages. However, noise
plays a beneficial role in DP learning models because it ensures both the privacy and utility guaran-
tee. This observation motivates us to actively utilize the quantum system noise to design quantum
DP algorithms. In this paper, we propose a quantum differentially private Lasso estimator to ac-
complish private sparse regression learning tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
quantum private learning algorithm with runtime advantages and a nearly optimal utility guar-
antee. In principle, our proposal can be efficiently implemented on near-term quantum machines.
Numerical simulation results accord with our theoretical analysis. The achieved results of our pro-
posal open an avenue to achieve runtime speedup with the provable privacy promise. One of the
interesting directions for the future study is to design more advanced quantum privacy mechanisms
that can provide both computational efficiency and utility improvements.
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Appendices
We organize the appendix as follows. In Appendix A, we illustrate the preparation of the oracle
Oα(t) . In Appendix B, we demonstrate the implementation of the privacy-preserved quantum mini-
mum finding algorithm and analyze its runtime complexity. We then analyze the utility bound and
the runtime complexity of the quantum Lasso estimator with classical Laplacian privacy mecha-
nism in Appendix C. We next prove the privacy guarantee, the utility guarantee, and the runtime
complexity of the quantum private Lasso estimator with quantum depolarization privacy mecha-
nism in Appendix D and E, respectively. We provide the proof of the privacy guarantee, the utility
guarantee and the runtime complexity of the quantum private Lasso estimator with the adaptive
privacy mechanism in Appendix F and G, respectively.
A Proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we first elaborate the preparation of oracle Oα(t) to generate the quantum state∣∣α(t)〉 in Subsection A.1. We then analyze the required runtime complexity to implement Oα(t) in
Subsection A.2. Last, we leave the proof of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, which are employed to support
the runtime analysis of implementing Oα(t) , in Subsection A.3 and Subsection A.4, respectively.
A.1 Implementation of the state preparation oracle
The state preparation oracle Oα(t) in Alg. 3 aims to prepare the quantum state
∣∣α(t)〉 with α(t) ∈
R2d, where
α(t)s :=〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉 = ∇sL(θ(t)) = −
1
N
n∑
i=1
Xis
(
yi − 〈Xi,θ(t)〉
)
, (37)
for 1 < s ≤ d, and α(t)s = −α(t)s−d for d < s ≤ 2d.
The oracle Oα(t) can be efficiently implemented with an extra O(1) runtime complexity if we
have access to
Oαˆ(t) : |0〉 →
1√
d
d∑
s=1
|s〉
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉 . (38)
Specifically, we append an ancillary qubit and perform H gate to create
H ⊗Oαˆ(t) |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 →
1√
2d
d∑
s′=1
|0〉 ∣∣s′〉 ∣∣∣α(t)s′ 〉+ |1〉 ∣∣s′〉 ∣∣∣α(t)s′ 〉 . (39)
Next, we use a CNOT gate to flip the sign of αs′ , where the control and target qubits are the first
qubit and the specific qubit that records the sign information of α
(t)
s′ , i.e.,
1√
2d
d∑
s′=1
(
|0〉 ∣∣s′〉 ∣∣∣α(t)s′ 〉+ |1〉 ∣∣s′〉 ∣∣∣−α(t)s′ 〉) . (40)
Absorbing the first qubit into the register |s〉, we obtain
1√
2d
(
d∑
s=1
|s〉
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉+ 2d∑
s=d
|s〉
∣∣∣−α(t)s−d〉
)
=
1√
2d
(
2d∑
s=1
|s〉
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉
)
:=
∣∣∣α(t)〉 . (41)
We elaborate the implementation of the oracle Oαˆ(t) in the following subsection.
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A.1.1 Implementation of Oαˆ(t)
The implementation of the state preparation oracle Oαˆ(t) by leveraging the reformulated expression
of α(t) in Eqn. (37) is summarized in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Quantum State Preparation oracle Oαˆ(t)
1: Input: Input oracles OX, Oy, and classical input θ
(t).
2: Introduce quantum registers r0 and r1, and apply Hadamard transformation to prepare the
quantum state
|0〉 Hadamard−−−−−−−−−→
transformation
1√
dN
d∑
s=1
|s〉r0
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1 ;
3: Introduce the second quantum register r2 and apply oracle Oz formulated in Lemma 5 to the
register r1 and r2, i.e., let z
(t)
i = yi − 〈Xi,θ(t)〉,
1√
dN
d∑
s=1
|s〉r0
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1 →
1√
dN
d∑
s=1
|s〉r0
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1
∣∣∣z(t)i 〉
r2
;
4: Introduce the third quantum register r3 and employ OX to generate
1√
dN
d∑
s=1
|s〉r0
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1
∣∣∣z(t)i 〉
r2
|Xis〉r3 ;
5: Introduce the fourth quantum register r4, and apply the quantum operation Uinner as formulated
in Lemma 6 to the quantum registers r2 and r3 to obtain the state
1√
d
d∑
s=1
|s〉r0
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉
r4
;
6: Output: Output
∣∣α(t)〉 = 1√
d
∑
s |s〉r0
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉;
The inputs of Alg. 7 are two oracles, i.e., OX and Oy, and the classical input θ
(t) for t ∈ [T ].
From Line 2 to Line 3 of Alg. 7, we employ Hadamard transformations and an oracle Oz,
Oz :
1√
N
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1 →
1√
N
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1
∣∣∣z(t)i 〉
r2
, (42)
to load the vector z(t), where for any i ∈ [N ], z(t)i := yi− 〈Xi,θ(t)〉 in Eqn. (37), into the quantum
register r2. The construction of Oz requires O˜(T
2) runtime, whose proof is given in Subsection A.3.
Lemma 5. Given access to oracles OX and Oy, and the classical input θ
(t), the oracle Oz can be
implemented in O˜(T 2) runtime complexity.
In Line 5 of Alg. 7, we aim to compute z
(t)
i Xis and record the result in the quantum register
r4. Specifically, we apply the oracle Uinner to the quantum registers r1 and r4 to compute α
(t)
s =∑
i z
(t)
i Xis. The implementation of Uinner is summarized by the following lemma.
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Lemma 6. Given the access to the oracle OX and Oz, there exists a quantum operation Uinner
that estimates the inner product 〈X>s , z(t)〉 with error ς and outputs the state formulated in Line 5
of Alg. 7 with successful probability 1 − 2b. Suppose that the runtime to implement Oz is Tz, the
runtime complexity to implement Uinner is O(Tz
√
N log(1/b)/ς).
The proof of Lemma 6 is given in Subsection A.4.
A.2 Runtime complexity
Proof of Theorem 3. The runtime complexity of the implementation of Oαˆ(t) , as illustrated in Alg. 7
can be effectively obtained by combining the result of Lemma 5, 6, and 7. Note that the error and
uncertainty to prepare the oracle O
(t)
α is introduced by Lemma 6. In particular, the target state in
Line 5 of Alg. 7 can only be approximately prepared in error ς with successful probability 1 − 2b.
Therefore, the oracle O
(t)
α prepares the state
∣∣α˜(t)〉, which satisfies |α(t)s − α˜(t)s | ≤ ς for any s ∈ [2d],
with successful probability 1− 2b.
We now analyze the required runtime complexity Line by Line. The computation cost of Line
2 is O˜(1), since only Hadamard transformation is employed. In Line 3, we use the oracle Oz with
the runtime complexity O˜(T 2), supported by Lemma 5. In Line 4, we call the oracle OX , which
takes O(1) runtime. The runtime complexity from Line 2 to Line 4 is O˜(T 2).
In Line 5, we employ Uinner to prepare the target state. Following the conclusion of Lemma 5,
the oracle Oz corresponds to the unitary transformations used in Line 2-4, which requires O˜(T
2)
runtime complexity to implement it. Then, supported by Lemma 6, with successful probability
1− 2b, the oracle Uinner prepares the target state with error ς in runtime O˜(T 2
√
N/ς).
Overall, the runtime complexity of Alg. 7 is O˜(T 2
√
N/ς), which is dominated by Line 5. Since
the oracle O
(t)
α can be efficiently implemented by using Oαˆ(t) with an extra O(1) runtime, the
runtime complexity to implement O
(t)
α is also O˜(T
2
√
N/ς).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
The proof of Lemma 5, or equivalently, the implementation of oracle Oz, uses the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Denote the quantum oracle that prepares a state corresponding to θ(t) as Oθ(t), i.e.,
Oθ(t) : |0〉 →
1√
d
d∑
j=1
|j〉
∣∣∣θ(t)j 〉 . (43)
Given the classical input θ(t) ∈ Rd with t ∈ [T ], the oracle Oθ(t) formulated in Eqn. (43) can be
constructed in O˜(T ) runtime complexity.
Proof of Lemma 7. Recall the updating rule of θ(t) described in Frank-Wolfe algorithm. The num-
ber of non-zero entries of θ(t) at the t step is no greater than t. The sparsity of θ(t) implies that
the oracle Oθ(t) can be efficiently implemented by using single and two qubits gates with O˜(T )
complexity. The implementation of Oθ(t) is as follows, i.e.,
|0〉 O(log d) H gates−−−−−−−−−−→ 1√
d
d∑
j=1
|j〉 |0〉 O˜(T ) multi-control gates−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1√
d
d∑
j=1
|j〉
∣∣∣θ(t)j 〉 . (44)
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For each entry θ
(t)
j with a constant precision, we need O(1) multi-control log d-qubits gates to
encode it into the state |j〉
∣∣∣θ(t)j 〉. Since the multi-control log d-qubits gate can be implemented
by O(poly(log d)) Toffoli gates and each Toffoli gate can be implemented by constant single and
two qubits gates [64], the required number of single and two qubits gates to implement the multi-
control log d-qubits gate is O(poly(log d)). The sparsity of θ(t) implies that the total number of
multi-control log d-qubits gates is O(T ). Alternatively, the required number of single and two qubits
gates to build Oθ(t) is O(poly(log d)T ) = O˜(T ).
Algorithm 8 Quantum oracle Oz
1: Input: Oracles OX, Oy, and Oθ(t) .
2: Define the set J as the collection of indexes that corresponds to the non-zero entries of θ(t);
3: Prepare the uniform superposition state 1√
N
∑N
i=1 |i〉 ;
4: Introduce quantum registers r1, r2, and r3, and separately apply Oy, OX, and Oθ(t) to obtain
1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉r1
∑
j∈J
|j〉 |Xij〉r2
∣∣∣θ(t)j 〉
r3
;
5: Apply quantum multiplier [65] to r2 and r3, store the result in quantum register r4, and then
uncompute and delete r2 and r3, i.e.,
1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉r1
∑
j∈J
|j〉
∣∣∣Xijθ(t)j 〉
r4
;
6: Apply the oracle Ov (see Eqn. (45)) to the register r4 and record v
(t)
i =
∑
j Xijθ
(t)
j in quantum
register r5, i.e.,
1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉r1
∣∣∣v(t)i 〉
r5
;
7: Output: Apply quantum subtractor [65] to record z
(t)
i in the quantum register r6 conditionally
controlled by |i〉, and then uncompute and delete r1 and r5, i.e., 1√N
∑N
i=1 |i〉
∣∣∣z(t)i 〉
r6
.
We now employ the result of Lemma 7 to prove Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. We illustrate the implementation of the oracle Oz in Alg. 8 and analyze its
runtime complexity Line by Line. In particular, the runtime complexity of Line 3 is O˜(1) by
applying Hadamard transformation. The runtime complexity of Line 4 is O˜(T ), since the runtime
complexity to implement OX and Oy is O(1) and the runtime complexity to implement Oθ(t) is
O˜(T ). In Line 5 and Line 7, the runtime complexity to conduct the multiplication and subtraction
is O(1), supported by [65].
In Line 6, the oracle Ov is employed to compute v
(t) and record the result in the quantum
register r5. Note that, due to the sparsity of θ
(t), the result of v
(t)
i only relates to non-zero entries
of θ(t). Motivated by such a fact, instead of encoding in total d entries, we only encode the entries
whose indexes belong to the set J into quantum states. The implementation of Ov exploits the
property that the cardinality |J | is no greater than T with T ∼ O(log(N)). In particular, given the
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quantum state formulated in Line 5 of Alg. 8, the oracle Ov is composed of the following unitary
transformations, i.e.,
1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉
∑
j∈J
|j〉
∣∣∣Xijθ(t)j 〉
r4
→ 1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉
∑
j∈J
|j〉
∣∣∣Xijθ(t)j 〉
r4
|0〉q2,...,q|J|
→ 1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉
∑
j∈J
|j〉
∣∣∣Xijθ(t)j 〉
r4
∣∣∣Xi,j+1θ(t)j+1〉
q2
|· · ·〉q3,...,q|J|−1
∣∣∣Xi,j−1θ(t)j−1〉
q|J|
→ 1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉
∑
j∈J
|j〉
∣∣∣Xijθ(t)j 〉
r4
∣∣∣Xi,j+1θ(t)j+1〉
q2
|· · ·〉q3,...,q|J|−1
∣∣∣Xi,j−1θ(t)j−1〉
q|J|
|v1〉r5
→ 1√
N |J |
N∑
i=1
|i〉 |yi〉
∣∣∣v(t)i 〉
r5
. (45)
The first arrow in Eqn. (45) is introducing |J | − 1 quantum registers. The second arrow indicates
that, the result Xijθ
(t)
j for the different j is recorded in |J | − 1 quantum registers separately, by
repeatedly calling Line 4-5 of Alg. 8 to {q2, ..., q|J |} in total |J | − 1 queries. The last arrow shows
that we uncompute and delete all quantum registers |j〉, r4, and {qi}|J |i=2.
An observation of Eqn. (45) is that the runtime complexity to implement Ov is dominated by
the second arrow. Since the runtime complexity of Line 4-5 is O˜(T ), the runtime complexity to
implement Ov is O((|J | − 1)T ) ≤ O˜(T 2).
Overall, the runtime complexity of Alg. 8 is O˜(T 2), which is dominated by implementing Ov.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 is a direct consequence of the following proposition [66], which computes the inner product
of two vectors.
Proposition 2 (Modified from Lemma A.10, [66]). Suppose that we have access to two quantum
oracles OX> and Oz with X
> ∈ Rd×N and z ∈ RN ,
OX> : |i〉 |0〉 →
1√
N
|i〉
∑
j
∣∣∣X>ij〉 (46)
Oz : |0〉 → 1√
N
∑
j
|j〉 |zj〉 . (47)
Denote the runtime complexity to implement OX> and Oz is at most O(Tmax), and ‖Xi∗‖ =
maxi ‖Xi‖, there exists a quantum algorithm that, with probability at least 1− 2b, outputs the state
|i〉
∣∣∣〈X>i , z〉〉 , (48)
where |〈X>i , z〉 − 〈X>i , z〉| ≤ ς in O(Tmax‖Xi∗‖ log(1/b)ς ) runtime.
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Proof of Lemma 6. The implementation of Oinner directly employs the result of Proposition 2. Re-
call that, given the state
1√
2dN
2d∑
s=1
|s〉
N∑
i=1
|i〉r1
∣∣∣z(t)i 〉
r2
|Xis〉r3 , (49)
the oracle Oinner aims to estimate the inner production 〈X>s , z(t)〉 for any s ∈ [2d].
Following the above observation, we apply Proposition 2 to the quantum register r2 and r3 to
estimate 〈X>s , z(t)〉 in superposition. The result is stored in the quantum register r4. We then
uncompute the quantum registers r2 and r3, and output the obtained state.
With successful probability 1−2b, the oracleOinner prepares the estimated state 1√2d
∑
s |s〉
∣∣∣α(t)s 〉
r4
with error ς in runtime
O
(
Tz
√
N log(1/b)
ς
)
,
since Tmax = Tz and ‖Xi∗‖ ≤
√
N with the assumption ‖X‖∞ ≤ 1.
We remark that the core ingredients of Proposition 2 are the amplitude amplification and
phase estimation [67, 68]. Due to a huge number of control qubits gates used in quantum phase
estimation, the computation-resource requirement may be unfriendly to the near-term quantum
devices. Toward this issue, it is possible to attempt to employ a more advanced subroutine instead
of the original one such as [69].
B Proof of Corollary 2
We now leverage the result of the quantum minimum finding algorithm and Lemma 1 to prove
Corollary 2.
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall Alg. 1 and Lemma 1. The runtime of the quantum minimum finding
algorithm, i.e., 22.5
√
2d + 1.4 log22(2d), is dominated by applying Grover search algorithms and
preparing the initialized state, where the first part takes 22.5
√
2d (Line 6 of Alg. 1) and the second
part takes 1.4 log22(2d) (Line 4 of Alg. 1), respectively [49]. However, such a runtime cost is based
on the assumption that, the input oracle can be prepared in O(1) runtime. This is not the case
for the quantum Lasso. The construction of the input oracle Oα(t) to load different entries of α
(t)
takes Tα runtime. Therefore, the total runtime of the quantum minimum finding algorithm used
in the quantum non-private Lasso becomes O˜(Tα
√
2d), since the runtime to execute the Grover
search algorithms is O˜(Tα
√
2d) instead of O(
√
2d).
Since the successful probability of the quantum minimum finding algorithm is 1/2, with repeat-
edly querying such an algorithm c times, the probability that none of the c outcomes belong to the
minimum result is 1/2c. Therefore, with successful probability 1 − 1/2c, there exists at least one
target result among c outcomes.
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. To achieve Theorem 4, we first prove the utility bound and differential privacy
of the quantum private Lasso with the Laplacian privacy mechanism, and then discuss its runtime
complexity.
Utility bound and differential privacy. Recall the mechanism of the quantum private Lasso
with Laplacian privacy mechanism. Compared with the classical case [23], the only difference
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for the quantum private Lasso is adopting the quantum minimum finding algorithm to find the
basis vectors {eˆk(t)}Tt=1 with k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α(t)s + υ(t)s . As discussed in proof of Theorem
2, these basis vectors can be located with successful probability 1 − o(1). In other words, with
successful probability 1−o(1), the classical and quantum private Lasso share the same randomness
or noise perturbation introduced by Laplacian privacy mechanism, guaranteed by the same variance
parameter λ.
Under this observation, we can conclude that, with successful probability 1 − o(1), the utility
bound and the differential privacy between quantum and classical private Lasso estimators is same.
Therefore, supported by the result of Lemma 3, we obtain that with successful probability 1−o(1),
the utility bound of quantum private Lasso estimator is O˜(1/N2/3) and the quantum private Lasso
estimator is (, δ)-differentially private.
Runtime complexity. As shown in the main text, the runtime cost of the quantum private
Lasso at the t-th iteration is O˜(Nd + d3/2). In particular, at the t-th iteration, the computation
of the classical vector α(t) + υ(t) takes O(Nd) runtime, since the computation of α(t) involves the
multiplication of X and θ(t) (see Eqn. (9)), which uses O(Nd) runtime, and the summation of two
vectors, i.e., α(t) and υ(t), needs O(d) runtime. Once α(t) + υ(t) ∈ R2d is prepared, encoding this
dense vector into quantum state requests O(d) runtime, following the proof of Lemma 7. According
to Corollary 2, the runtime to locate k(t) is O˜(d3/2), since the preparation of
∣∣α(t) + υ(t)〉 takes
O(d) runtime. In summary, the runtime cost of quantum Lasso at the t-th iteration is O˜(Nd+d3/2),
where the first term corresponds to the runtime cost to compute α(t) + υ(t) and the second term
corresponds to find k(t). Since the number of iterations is T = O( (N)
2/3
L
2/3
1
) (i.e., to achieve the
optimal utility bound), the runtime cost of the quantum private Lasso with Laplacian privacy
mechanism is
O˜(T
√
Nd+ Td3/2) = O˜
(
2/3N5/2d
L
2/3
1
+
(N)2/3d3/2
L
2/3
1
)
= O˜
(
2/3N5/2d+N2/32/3d3/2
)
, (50)
where we omit the constant terms Cf and L1 in the last equality.
D Proof of Theorem 5
Proposition 3 (Strong composition, Theorem 3.3, [70]). For every ′ > 0, δ, δ′ > 0, and k ∈ N,
the class of (′, δ′)-differentially private mechanism is (, kδ′+ δ)-differentially private under k-fold
adaptive composition, for
 =
√
2k ln(1/δ)′ + k′0 , (51)
where 0 = e
′ − 1.
Proof of Theorem 5. Recall that the randomness of quantum private Lasso estimator is introduced
by the depolarization channel at each iteration t with t ∈ [T ]. Here we first quantify the differential
privacy property provided by the quantum depolarization mechanism at the t-iteration and then
employ the strong composition property as formulated in Proposition 3 to demonstrate the privacy
guarantee of quantum private Lasso estimator.
Denote Line 6 of Alg. 5 used in the t-th iteration, which employs the given input dataset
D = {X,y} to locate the index K(t), as the mechanism M. Following the definition of differential
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privacy, we now bound the ratio P(M(D)=K
(t))
P(M(D′)=K(t)) , where D
′ is the neighborhood dataset of D, and
K(t) ∈ [2d].
Given the dataset D, let the index that corresponds to the minimum entry of α(t) be k(t). Simi-
larly, denoted α¯(t) as the projected result with respect to the datasetD′, i.e., α¯(t)s = 〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t), D′)〉
with s ∈ [2d], let the index that corresponds to the minimum entry of α¯(t) be k¯(t). Recall the mech-
anism of quantum private Lasso. The introduced depolarization channel leads to the following
phenomenon: Given access to the state
∣∣α(t)〉, the quantum private Lasso will output k(t) with
probability (1− p/2) + p/4d, while the index k′ with k′ ∈ [2d] \ k(t) will be output with probability
p/4d. The same rule applies to the input dataset D′. With setting K(t) = k(t), we obtain the
following relation
P(M(D) = k(t))
P(M(D′) = k(t)) ≤
1− p2 + p4d
p
4d
=
4d(1− p2)
p
+ 1 . (52)
To guarantee ′-differential privacy at the t-th iteration, the following relation should be satisfied
P(M(D) = k(t))
P(M(D′) = k(t)) ≤
4d(1− p2)
p
+ 1 ≤ e′ . (53)
After simplification, given the depolarization rate p, the maximum preserved privacy  is
′ = ln
(
1 +
4d(1− p2)
p
)
. (54)
Recall that quantum Lasso estimator iteratively applies the quantum depolarization mechanism
in total of T iterations. Since each iteration promises ′-differential property, the strong composition
property of differential privacy as stated in Proposition 3 implies that quantum Lasso estimator
achieves (, δ)-differential privacy after T iterations, where
 ≈
√
2T ln(1/δ)′ . (55)
Note that we omit term k′0, driven by the fact that
√
2T ln(1/δ) generally dominates the result
with respect to the range of ′. Therefore, the quantum private Lasso estimator with depolarization
noise can achieve (, δ)-differential privacy with
 =
√
2T ln(1/δ) ln
(
1 +
4d(1− p2)
p
)
. (56)
E Proof of Theorem 6
Here we first prove the utility bound of quantum private Lasso with depolarization noise, and then
quantify its runtime complexity.
E.1 Error analysis and utility bound
Proof of Theorem 6. The outline of the proof is as follows. We first examine the relation between
the error term ϑ and the selected basis eˆK(t) , which is formulated Eqn. (11). Then, by employing
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the attained ϑ and the result of Proposition 1, we can quantify the utility bound of the proposed
quantum private Lasso estimator.
We now analyze how the selected basis eˆK(t) as described in Alg. 5 affects the error term ϑ, where
the imperfection of the state preparation oracle Oα(t) and the failure probability of the quantum
minimum finding algorithm are considered. Specifically, supported by Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (16),
with successful probability 1− o(1), the output index of the quantum minimum finding algorithm
(at Line 2 of Alg. 5) satisfies
k˜(t) = arg min
s∈[2d]
α˜(t)s , with |α˜(t)s −α(t)s | ≤ ς, ∀s ∈ [2d] , (57)
Consequently, the generated state in Line 3 of Alg. 5 is
∣∣∣Φ(k′, k˜(t))〉 = |k′〉r1 ∣∣k(t)〉r2 ∣∣∣g(k′, k˜(t))〉r3 .
After applying the depolairizaiton channel Ep (Line 4 of Alg. 5) to
∣∣∣Φ(k′, k˜(t))〉, with the probability
1−p, the output state is still
∣∣∣Φ(k′, k˜(t))〉; otherwise, the output state is the maximally mixed state.
This result indicates that, when the quantum register r3 is observed (Line 5-6 of Alg. 5), with the
probability 1− p/2 + p/4d, we have eˆK(t) = eˆk˜(t) ; otherwise, eˆK(t) = eˆk with k ∈ [2d] \ k˜(t). Then
we can obtain
E
[
〈eˆK(t) ,∇L(θ(t))〉
]
=(1− p
2
+
p
4d
)〈eˆk˜(t) ,∇L(θ(t))〉+ (
p
2
− p
4d
)〈eˆk′ ,∇L(θ(t))〉
≤(1− p
2
+
p
4d
) min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉+ 2ς + (p
2
− p
4d
)L1
= min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉+ 2ς + (p
2
− p
4d
)(L1 − min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉)
≤ min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉+ 2ς + (p
2
− p
4d
)2L1
≤ min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉+ 2ς + pL1 , (58)
where the first inequality employs 〈eˆk′ ,∇L(θ(t))〉 ≤ maxe˜s∈S〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉 = ‖∇L(θ(t))‖∞ ≤
‖∇L(θ(t))‖2 ≤ L1 and Eqn. (17), the second inequality comes from the fact
− min
eˆs∈S
〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉 ≤ ‖∇L(θ(t))‖∞ ≤ L1 ,
and the last inequality uses p/2− p/4d ≤ p/2.
The result of Eqn. (58) indicates that by choosing ϑ = 4ς+2pL1µtCf , the output of Alg. 5 satisfies
Eqn. (11). Therefore, with successful probability 1− o(1), Proposition 1 yeilds
RL ≤ 2Cf
T + 2
(1 + p
2L1
µtCf
+
4ς
µtCf
) . (59)
With the aim of satisfying the differential privacy, the probability p contained in RL should be
chosen as
p =
1
e/
√
2T ln(1/δ)−1
4d +
1
2
≤ 4d
√
2T ln(1/δ)

, (60)
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where the equality comes from Theorem 5 by reformulating Eqn. (22), and the inequality uses
ex − 1 ≥ x for x > −1. Combining the above equation with Eqn. (59), with the successful
probability 1− o(1), the utility bound yields
RL ≤ 2Cf
T + 2
(1 +
4d
√
2T ln(1/δ)

2L1
µtCf
+
4ς
µtCf
)
≤2Cf
T
+
16dT 1/2 ln1/2(1/δ)L1

+ 8ς , (61)
where the last inequality uses µt = 1/(T + 2).
The tight upper utility bound of Eqn. (61) can be achieved by setting T =
C
2/3
f 
2/3
d2/3 ln1/3(1/δ)L
2/3
1
, i.e.,
RL = O
C1/3f d2/3L2/31 ln1/3(1/δ)
2/3
+ ς
 = O˜(d2/3
2/3
+ ς
)
, (62)
where the equality hides the constant terms Cf and L1.
E.2 Runtime complexity
The analysis of the runtime cost employs the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Supposed that we have access to the oracle Oα(t) in runtime Tα(t), the runtime com-
plexity to execute Line 3-5 of Alg. 5 is Tα(t).
Proof of Lemma 8. We analyze the runtime cost Line by Line. In Line 3, the construction of the
comparator Ocomp is dominated by the preparation of Oα(t) , which takes Tα(t) runtime. In Line
4, introducing the depolarization channel costs O(1) runtime, supported by [56, 57]. In Line 5,
observe the register requires O(1) runtime. Overall, the runtime to execute Line 3-5 of Alg. 5 is
Tα(t) .
Proof of Theorem 6. Recall that the only difference between the non-private Lasso and the quantum
private Lasso is Line 3-5 of Alg. 5. The runtime complexity to execute these three lines is Tα =
O˜(T 2
√
N/ς), supported by Lemma 8 and Theorem 3. Therefore, the runtime complexity to execute
the quantum private Lasso is identical to the non-private case, which is O˜(T (Tα
√
d)).
Following the result of Eqn. (62), with setting T =
C
2/3
f 
2/3
d2/3 ln1/3(1/δ)L
2/3
1
, the quantum private Lasso
achieves the utility bound RL = O˜
(
C
1/3
f d
2/3L
2/3
1
2/3
)
with the runtime complexity
O˜
(
T 3
√
N
√
d/ς
)
= O˜
(
C2f 
2N1/2
L21d
3/2ς
)
= O˜
(
2N1/2
d3/2ς
)
, (63)
where the last equality hides the constant terms Cf and L1.
F Proof of Theorem 7
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof of Theorem 7 is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. In particular,
we first quantify the differential privacy property provided by the adaptive privacy mechanism at
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the t-th iteration and then employ the strong composition property in Proposition 3 to demonstrate
the privacy guarantee of the quantum private Lasso estimator.
Denote Line 6 of Alg. 6 at the t-th iteration, which employs the given input dataset D =
{X,y} to locate the index K(t), as the mechanism M. Note that the range of the mechanism
is K. Based on the definition of differential privacy, we quantify the upper bound of the ratio of
maxK(t)∈K
Pr(M(D)=K(t))
Pr(M(D′)=K(t)) , where D
′ is the neighborhood dataset of D and K(t) ∈ K as follows:
max
K(t)∈K
Pr
(M(D) = K(t))
Pr
(M(D′) = K(t)) = Pr
(M(D) = k(t))
Pr
(M(D′) = k(t))
≤
(1− p) + p|K|
p
|K|
≤1− p
p
(
4 +
16
N∆
)
+ 1 . (64)
The first equality follows when K(t) = k(t) and k(t) = arg mins∈[2d]α
(t)
s . The first inequality is
guaranteed by the following facts. In particular, given the dataset D, the probability to return k(t)
is 1−p+p/|K|, where the first term comes from the fact that with probability 1−p, the mechanism
M(D) outputs k(t) = arg mins α˜(t)s , and the second term p/|K| employs the fact that, under the
prior probability p, the probability to obtain k(t) by uniformly sampling from |K| candidates is 1/|K|.
Overall, we have Pr
(M(D) = k(t)) = 1− p+ p/|K|. However, given the dataset D′, the probability
to return k(t) is lower bounded by 1/|K|, since k(t) may not be the minimum entry of α′(t), i.e.,
α
′(t)
s = 〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t), D′)〉 for all s ∈ [2d], and k(t) can only be acquired by uniformly sampling
from |K| candidates. Therefore, we obtain Pr(M(D′) = k(t)) ≥ p/|K|. The second inequality uses
Eqn. (36) of Lemma 4, i.e., |K| = d3 + 16N∆e ≤ 4 + 16N∆ .
To guarantee ′-differential privacy at the t-th iteration, the following relation should be satisfied
P(M(D) = k(t))
P(M(D′) = k(t)) ≤
1− p
p
(
4 +
16
N∆
)
+ 1 ≤ e′ . (65)
The privacy budget ′ satisfies
′ = ln
(
1 +
1− p
p
(
4 +
16
N∆
))
. (66)
Then, with employing the strong composition property as shown in Proposition 3, the proposed
quantum Lasso estimator achieves (, δ)-differential privacy after T iterations, where
 ≈
√
2T ln(1/δ)′ =
√
2T ln(1/δ) ln
(
1 +
1− p
p
(
4 +
16
N∆
))
. (67)
G Proof of Theorem 8
In this section, we separately prove the utility bound and the runtime complexity of the proposed
quantum private Lasso.
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G.1 Utility bound
Proof. The analysis of the utility bound is analogous to the proof of Theorem 6. In particular, we
first analyze how the adaptive mechanism affects the error term ϑ and then employ the attained ϑ
to quantify the utility bound RL, following the result of Proposition 1.
We first examine the relationship between the output of the selected basis eˆK(t) of Alg. 6 and
Eqn. (11). In particular, when the imperfection in the state preparation oracle Oα(t) and in the
quantum minimum finding algorithm is considered as in Eqn. (14) and Eqn. (16), Line 5 of Alg. 6
generates the collected indexes in K correspond to the last |K| minimum entries of α˜(t)s so that
|α˜(t)s −α(t)s | ≤ ς =
∆
4
, ∀s ∈ K, (68)
with successful probability 1 − o(1). Given this index set K, Line 6-7 of Alg. 6 guarantees the
generation of the minimal basis index k(t) corresponding to the minimum entry of α(t) with the
probability 1− p+ p/|K|. Then we have
E
[
〈eˆK(t) ,∇L(θ(t))〉
]
=
(
1− p+ p|K|
)
α
(t)
k(t)
+
(
p− p|K|
)
α
(t)
k∈K\k(t)
≤
(
1− p+ p|K|
)
α
(t)
k(t)
+
(
p− p|K|
)(
|K|∆+α(t)
k(t)
)
≤α(t)
k(t)
+ p|K|∆ , (69)
where the first inequality comes from the fact, for all k ∈ K \ k(t),
α
(t)
k ≤ maxk∈K α
(t)
k ≤ |K|∆+α(t)k(t) ,
since |α(t)s −α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for all s, q ∈ [2d] with s 6= q as shown in Eqn. (32), and the second inequality
uses (p− p/|K|) ≤ p.
The result of Eqn. (69), indicates that by choosing ϑ = 2p|K|∆µtCf , under the successful scenario
given in Eqn. (68), the output of Alg. 6 satisfies Eqn. (11). Therefore, with successful probability
1− o(1), Proposition 1 yields
RL ≤ 2Cf
T + 2
(
1 +
2p|K|∆
µtCf
)
. (70)
Two additional steps have to be done from here. Firstly, we have to choose the probability p as
follows, in order to satisfy the differentially private property in Theorem 7:
p =
1
(e/
√
2T ln(1/δ) − 1)/(4 + 16N∆) + 1
≤ (4 +
16
N∆)
√
2T ln(1/δ)

, (71)
where the equality is obtained by reformulating Eqn. (25), and the inequality employs ex − 1 ≥ x
for x > −1.
Secondly, we can show that ∆ is upper bounded by
∆ ≤
√
2L1
N
. (72)
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This claim is easy to check. Due to the Lipschitz property of the loss function L with ‖∇L‖2 ≤ L1,
we have
‖α(t)‖2 =
√∑
s∈[2d]
|〈eˆs,∇L(θ(t))〉|2 =
√
2‖L(θ(t))‖22 ≤
√
2L1 .
The entry of α(t) is upper and lower bounded by
√
2L1 and −
√
2L1, respectively, because ‖α(t)‖∞ ≤
‖α(t)‖2 ≤
√
2L1. Finally, because of the assumption |α(t)s − α(t)q | ≥ ∆ for s 6= q, it is necessary to
guarantee
(2d− 1)∆ ≤
√
2L1 − (−
√
2L1)
⇒ ∆ ≤ 2
√
2L1
2d− 1 ≤
√
2L1
d
≤
√
2L1
N
. (73)
Combining Eqn. (71), Eqn. (72) with Eqn. (70), we obtain, with the successful probability
1− o(1), the utility bound of quantum private Lasso estimator yields
RL ≤ 2Cf
T
+
(
32L1
√
2T ln(1/δ)
N
+
256
√
2T ln(1/δ)
N
+
512
√
2T ln(1/δ)
N∆
)
. (74)
The tight utility bound RL is achieved by setting T =
C
2/3
f (N∆)
2/3
L
2/3
1 ln
1/3(1/δ)
, i.e.,
RL ≤ O˜
 C1/3f L2/31
(N∆)2/3
 = O˜( 1
(N∆)2/3
)
, (75)
where we hide the constant terms Cf and L1 in the final expression.
G.2 Runtime cost
Proof. The only difference between the quantum non-private Lasso and the private Lasso in Alg. 6 is
applying a modified quantum minimum finding algorithm to collect an index set K that corresponds
to |K| smallest values. Following the results of [71, 72], the runtime complexity of the quantum
algorithm that finds |K| minimum values is O(|K|Ts), where Ts refers to the runtime cost of the
quantum minimum finding algorithm. By leveraging Corollary 2 and Theorem 3, we have Ts =
O˜(T 2
√
Nd/ς). Since this searching step dominates the runtime cost for every iteration, we conclude
that the implementation of Alg. 6 takes
O˜(T |K|Ts) = O˜(|K|T 3
√
Nd/ς)
runtime.
With setting T = O˜(
C
2/3
f (N∆)
2/3
L
2/3
1
) to achieve the tight utility bound RL, |K| = d3 + 16N∆e and
the fact ς = ∆4 , the quantum private Lasso estimator takes the runtime
O˜((|K|T 3
√
Nd/ς)) ≤ O˜
(
C3f 
2N3/2d1/2
L21
)
= O˜
(
2N3/2d1/2
)
. (76)
The last inequality uses the explicit expression of |K| = d3 + 16N∆e and the fact ς = ∆4 . In the last
equality, we hide the constant terms Cf and L1.
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